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RIGHT TO A TRIAL BY JURY-THE CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES FORFEIT-
URES ACT-The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held that the
owner of property seized pursuant to the Controlled Substances
Forfeitures Act is entitled to a trial by jury.
Commonwealth v One (1) 1984 Camaro Coupe, Pa ,610 A2d
36 (1992).
In 1989, the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania filed a petition for
forfeiture and condemnation in the Court of Common Pleas of
Northumberland County seeking forfeiture of Cheryl and Kenneth
Stucks' 1984 Camaro pursuant to the Controlled Substances For-
feitures Act.1 The Stucks subsequently filed a claim to the vehicle
and demanded a jury trial.2
The trial court granted the request for a jury trial, but also
granted the Commonwealth's motion for certification of the case
required for interlocutory appeal on the question of whether a jury
trial is required for an action in forfeiture.3 The commonwealth
1. Commonwealth v One (1) 1984 Camaro Coupe, Pa , 610 A2d 36, 38 (1992).
The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania alleged that the Stucks had purchased the Camaro
with proceeds from the illegal sale of drugs and also had used the car to store illegal drugs.
Camaro, 610 A2d at 38. The section of the Controlled Substances Forfeitures Act that con-
cerns the forfeiture procedure provides:
(a) General procedure. The proceedings for the forfeiture or condemnation of prop-
erty, the sale of which is provided for in this chapter, shall be in rem, in which the
Commonwealth shall be the plaintiff and the property the defendant. A petition shall
be filed in the court of common pleas of the judicial district where the property is
located, verified by oath or affirmation of an officer or citizen, containing the
following:
(1) A description of the property seized.
(2) A statement of the time and place seized.
(3) The owner, if known.
(4) The person or persons in possession, if known.
(5) An allegation that the property is subject to forfeiture pursuant to section
6801(a) (relating to loss of property rights to Commonwealth) and an averment of
material facts upon which the forfeiture action is based.
(6) A prayer for an order of forfeiture that the property be adjudged forfeited to
the Commonwealth and condemned and be ordered sold according to law, unless
cause be shown to the contrary.
42 Pa Cons Stat Ann § 6802 (Purdon 1992).
2. Camaro, 610 A2d at 38.
3. Id. Interlocutory appeal is "an appeal of a matter which is not determinable of
the controversy, but which is necessary for a suitable adjudication of the merits." Black's
Law Dictionary 815 (West, 6th ed 1990). The Commonwealth is therefore allowed to appeal
an issue before the case is fully adjudicated. Camaro, 610 A2d at 38.
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court granted the petition for permission to appeal and reversed
the trial court's order for a jury trial." The Stucks petitioned for
allowance of appeal and the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
granted allocatur.5
The sole issue considered by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
was whether the owner of property subject to forfeiture under the
Controlled Substances Forfeitures Act was entitled to a jury trial
pursuant to the Pennsylvania Constitution. The Commonwealth
argued that Article I, section 6 of the Pennsylvania Constitution
only required a jury trial if the proceeding existed at common law
in 1790. 7 Since the instant proceeding was created by statute after
1790, the Commonwealth argued that the right could only exist if
the legislature had expressly provided for it.8 The Stucks, on the
other hand, contended there was a common law basis for the action
even though the action arose from statutory law.9 Since in rem for-
feiture proceedings .before a jury existed at common law, the
Stucks believed a property owner's right to a jury trial had a suffi-
cient "common law basis."10 The court, agreeing with the Com-
monwealth's argument that there was no statutory requirement for
a jury trial in a substance forfeiture case," analyzed the question
by separating it into two distinct components.' 2 The first issue
presented for resolution was whether jury trials were required in
4. Id. The commonwealth court held that the jury trial right in a forfeiture proceed-
ing is not required by statute, suggested by legislative treatment or history, expressly guar-
anteed by the constitution, or based in common law. The court therefore concluded that
there is no right to a jury trial in a controlled substance forfeiture proceeding. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id at 37-38. Article I, section 6 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, which states
"trial by jury shall be as heretofore, and the right thereof remain inviolate," was interpreted
by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court to mean that all jury trial rights that existed at the
adoption of the Pennsylvania Constitution were preserved. Byers v Commonwealth, 42 Pa
89 (1862).
7. Camaro, 610 A2d at 38. If a proceeding existed before a jury in 1790, the year of
the adoption of the Pennsylvania Constitution, the Commonwealth argued that the proceed-
ing would always be heard before a jury as that right was codified in Article I, section 6 of
the Pennsylvania Constitution. The right became "preserved." Id.
8. Id.
9. Id at 39.
10. The Stucks cited two cases, Appeal of Watson, 377 Pa 495, .105 A2d 576 (1954),
and United States v One 1976 Mercedes Benz 280S, 618 F2d 453 (7th Cir 1980), which
substantiated the judicial belief that forfeiture proceedings before a jury arose from com-
mon law. Watson, 105 A2d at 577-78; Mercedes Benz, 618 F2d at 466.
11. Camaro, 610 A2d at 39. The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania argued at trial that
the Controlled Substances Forfeitures Act did not expressly state a right to a jury trial in
forfeiture proceedings. Id at 38.
• 12. Id at 39.
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forfeiture proceedings in 1790."8 The second issue, contingent upon
a finding that there were jury trials in forfeiture actions in 1790,
was to determine whether there existed a common law basis for the
proceeding."
In resolving the first question, the court resurrected a 1782
Pennsylvania Supreme Court case, Wilcox v Henry."6 Since the
Wilcox case involved the issues of forfeiture and contraband and
was tried before a jury, the court concluded that a property owner
in a forfeiture action had been entitled to a jury trial in 1790.16
Nonetheless, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that in order
to grant the Stucks a jury trial, it must also find a common law
basis in an action in forfeiture.
17
Rather than defining common law as law arising from the courts
instead of statutory law, the court set forth a separate definition."
"Common law basis," the court held, was law that had originated
in common law courts such as the Court of Exchequer, as opposed
to the Courts of Admiralty or Chancery.' 9 Accordingly, because
forfeiture cases were established through in rem proceedings in the
Court of Exchequer and were tried before a jury, the court con-
cluded that the forfeiture action at issue had a common law ba-
sis.2 It was therefore held by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
13. Id. The court reasoned that if jury trials were required in forfeiture hearings on
or before 1790 (the year the Pennsylvania Constitution was adopted), it would validate the
common law constitutional right to trial by jury for forfeiture proceedings. Id.
14. Id. Even if there were jury trials for forfeiture proceedings in 1790, those proceed-
ings must have been a part of the evolving American common law courts that originated in
England. Id at 39-41.
15. 1 US 41 (1782). The owner of salt, purchased from Britain before the American
army recaptured Philadelphia, was tried before a jury with the salt being the subject of the
forfeiture proceeding. Wilcox, 1 US at 41.
16. Camaro, 610 A2d at 39.
17. Id. The fact there was a jury trial for a forfeiture proceeding in 1782 did not
mean the proceeding had a "common law basis." Id.
18. Id at 39-40. The court stated that in the context of forfeiture cases, common law
does not stand for actions originating at common law because even prior to 1790, forfeiture
actions were based on statutory law. Id at 39.
19. Id. The Court of Exchequer, a common law court originating in England, had
jurisdiction over seizure cases on land, which were heard by the court sitting with a jury. Id
at 40.
20. Id at 41. The court described the absorption of the Court of Exchequer into the
common law of America in the form of in rem proceedings, which enforced forfeiture stat-
utes, by adopting the reasoning of United States Supreme Court Justice Stone in CJ Hen-
dry Co. v Moore, 318 US 133 (1943). "But to the generalization that a judgment in rem was
not a common law remedy there is an important exception. Forfeiture to the Crown of the
offending object, because it had been used in violation of law, by a procedure in rem was a
practice familiar not only to the English admiralty courts but to the Court of Exchequer."
CJ Hendry, 318 US at 137. In CJ Hendry, Justice Stone stated that other courts besides the
Duquesne Law Review Vol. 31:661
that the Stucks were entitled to a jury trial pursuant to the Penn-
sylvania Constitution.21
Justice McDermott's concurring opinion raised doubts about the
majority's historical analysis on two points.22 First, Justice McDer-
mott identified a twentieth century Pennsylvania Supreme Court
case where the court held that not all forfeiture proceedings re-
quired a jury trial.23 Justice McDermott expressed concern with re-
gard to the majority's willingness to overrule longstanding prece-
dent.2' He reasoned that often the underlying facts, specifically the
owner's guilt, were not in dispute.25
Secondly, Justice McDermott criticized the majority's two hun-
dred-year leap from the Wilcox holding with no historical con-
tinuity to support their conclusion. 26 He disagreed with the major-
ity's assumption that since a jury trial had once been mandated in
forfeiture proceedings, it follows that such mandate applies to pre-
sent forfeiture proceedings.2 7 While Justice McDermott agreed
with the majority insofar as the ruling applied only to those cases
where third parties claimed a lack of knowledge that their property
was illegally used by another or where the confiscated property was
instrumental in the commission of the crime,28 he disagreed that
Courts of Admiralty had jurisdiction on proceedings concerning property seized on land
under the common law of United States district courts. Id at 140-47. "The Court has never
held or said that the admiralty jurisdiction in a forfeiture case is exclusive, and it has re-
peatedly declared that, in cases of forfeiture of articles seized on land for violation of federal
statutes, the district courts proceed as courts of common law according to the course of the
Exchequer on informations in rem with trial by jury." Id at 153.
Therefore, Justice Stone, and the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania as well, reasoned that
American common law courts acquired the jurisdiction of the previous English Courts of
Exchequer; in other words, forfeiture actions have a "common law basis." Camaro, 610 A2d
at 41. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania also referred to the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Seventh Circuit, which reiterated the right to a jury trial for in rem proceed-
ings stemming from rich historical origins. United States v One 1976 Mercedes Benz 280S,
618 F2d 453, 466 (7th Cir 1980). "Both English and American practice prior to 1791 defi-
nitely recognized jury trial of in rem actions at common law as the established mode of
determining the propriety of statutory forfeitures on land for breach of statutory prohibi-
tions." Mercedes Benz, 618 F2d at 466.
21. Camaro, 610 A2d at 41.
22. Id at 41-42 (McDermott concurring).
23. Commonwealth v Bowers, 304 Pa 253, 155 A 605 (1931). Bowers, analogous to the
instant case, concerned the forfeiture of non-contraband items based on their alleged rela-
tionship to the contraband itself. No jury trial was afforded in the case. Bowers, 155 A at
608.
24. Camaro, 610 A2d at 42.
25. Id.
26. Id. See note 15 for details of the Wilcox case.
27. Id.
28. Id. Justice McDermott listed these factors as exceptions to the trial without a
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there was a blanket right to a jury trial in all forfeiture cases. 29
The common law forfeiture proceeding originated in the English
Courts of Admiralty and Exchequer."0 The court action evolved
into colonial American forfeiture proceedings as detailed in Chief
Justice Stone's opinion in CJ Hendry Co. v Moore, a 1943 United
States Supreme Court case.-" American courts, Chief Justice Stone
reasoned, developed by necessity an in rem action based in English
common law that allowed the state to recover property through a
forfeiture proceeding before a jury.32 Stone admitted that the
Court of Exchequer was never established in America, but argued
it had been absorbed by the common law courts of America.33
Moreover, the court of admiralty failed to subsequently obtain full
jurisdiction." In fact, section 9 of the Judiciary Act left states
"free to provide such a remedy in forfeiture cases where the arti-
cles are seized upon navigable waters of the state for violation of
state law.""5 Justice Stone stated that the common law nature of
the procedure and judgment in rem in forfeiture cases emerged
from the "common understanding of judges, lawyers, and text writ-
ers." 36 Though the forfeiture action was probably assumed to have
a common law basis, Justice Stone's historical analysis was consid-
ered to be definitive in giving owners of seized property the right
to a jury trial.
37
jury in forfeiture actions. Id.
.29. Id at 42. Justice McDermott did agree that the Stucks were within his exceptions,
as they had not been convicted before and the facts had not been adjudicated. Id.
30. CJ Hendry Co. v Moore, 318 US 133 (1943). "Forfeiture to the Crown of the
offending object, because it had been used in violation of law, by a procedure in rem was a
practice familiar not only to the English admiralty courts but to the Court of Exchequer."
CJ Hendry, 318 US at 137.
31. Id at 133-35. CJ Hendry concerned the rights of an owner of property that was
the subject of a forfeiture hearing who demanded a jury trial. Justice Stone focused his
analysis on determining if indeed the forfeiture proceeding jury right had a common law
basis. Id.
32. Id at 137. "The [English court of] Exchequer gave such a remedy for the forfei-
ture of articles seized on land for the violation of law." Id.
33. Id at 139. *
34. Id at 153. "Long before the adoption of the Constitution the common law courts
in the Colonies - and later in the states during the period of Confederation - were exercis-
ing jurisdiction in rem in the enforcement of forfeiture statutes." Id at 139.
35. The Judiciary Act of 1789, 1 Stat 73, § 9 (1789).
36. CJ Hendry, 318 US at 153.
37. Justice Stone's analysis has been often cited since its publication. An earlier
Pennsylvania forfeiture case, Commonwealth v One 1988 Ford Coupe VIN #
1FABP41A9JFI43651, analogous to the instant case, cited Justice Stone's analysis. Ford
Coupe, 393 Pa Super 320, 329-30, 574 A2d 631, 636 (1990). In- addition, Justice Stone's
historical analysis was vital to cases involving government action, namely, the imposition of
Duquesne Law Review Vol. 31:661
Actions in forfeiture have existed in Pennsylvania since the
American Revolution. 8 Property in the colonial era which had
been seized on land or sea often had to be forfeited as possible
contraband, subject to a determination by the proper court.3 9 In
Wilcox v Henry, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania was faced
with the issue of whether salt, forfeited to the United States after
the American army recaptured Philadelphia, was contraband. 0
The case, which resulted in a jury trial, was crucial to the develop-
ment of Pennsylvania's forfeiture law since it showed that the right
to trial by jury existed before the adoption of the Pennsylvania
Constitution.4 1 Eight years later, the Pennsylvania legislature em-
bodied the right to a jury trial in Article I, section 6 of the Penn-
sylvania Constitution.42
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania determined the extent and
application of the right to a trial by jury in the 1862 decision, By-
ers v Commonwealth."s In this decision, the court interpreted the
United States and Pennsylvania Constitutions as preserving the
right to a jury but not extending that right." Later, in 1959 and
1961, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court refined this holding, indi-
cating that Pennsylvania would preserve the right to a trial by jury
where it existed at the time the Pennsylvania Constitution was
penalties and restrictions on commerce. United States v JB Williams Co., Inc., 498 F2d 414,
423 (2d Cir 1974); In re Ohio River Disaster Litigation, 579 F Supp 1273, 1278 (SD Ohio
1984).
38. Wilcox v Henry, 1 US 41 (1782).
39. CJ Hendry, 318 US at 137. "The [English Court of] exchequer gave such a rem-
edy for the forfeiture of articles seized on land for the violation of law. And, concurrently
with the admiralty, it entertained true proceedings in rem for the forfeiture of vessels for
violation on navigable waters." Id.
40. Wilcox, 1 US at 41.
41.. Two twentieth century Pennsylvania cases, WJ Dillner Co v Pennsylvania Public
Utilities Commission, 191 Pa Super 136, 155 A2d 429 (1959), and William Goldman Thea-
tres, Inc. v Dana, 405 Pa 83, 173 A2d 59 (1961), held that all civil cases tried by a jury on or
before 1790 (the adoption of the Pennsylvania Constitution) preserved the right to a jury
trial in those proceedings. WJ Dillner, 155 A2d at 435; Goldman, 173 A2d at 64.
42. PA Const, Art I, § 6. "Trial by jury shall be as heretofore, and the right thereof
remain inviolate." Id.
43. 42 Pa 89 (1862). The case concerned two men convicted as professional thieves
and pickpockets who demanded a jury trial. The court determined the right to a jury trial
"was a right the title to which is founded upon usage, and its measure is therefore to be
sought in the usages which prevailed at the time when it was asserted." Byers, 42 Pa at 94.
44. US Const, Amends VI and XIV, § 1. PA Const, Art I, § 6. The accused were
afforded a jury trial since the right to a jury existed in criminal proceedings in 1790. The
right was therefore "preserved" when the Pennsylvania Constitution codified the jury right
in 1790. Byers, 42' Pa at 96.
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adopted.45
If the right to a jury in a specific action did not exist at the time
of the framing of the Pennsylvania Constitution, however, the
right would not be afforded."
Several years later, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit in United States v One 1976 Mercedes Benz
280S17 consolidated the history of the forfeiture trial in America
and the subsequent right to a jury trial."' The court indicated that
the Judiciary Act of 1789,"' which officially established United
States judicial courts as they exist today, specifically granted jury
trials to all civil actions except those within admiralty or maritime
jurisdiction." The court also cited the dicta of two federal jus-
tices51 which confirmed the right to a jury in forfeiture- proceedings
concerning seizures on land. Both justices admitted that "seizure"
trials, except in admiralty, are triable to a jury and have their basis
in common law.52 The court in Mercedes Benz also noted the his-
torical deference accorded to jury trials."3 All of these sources led
45. It has long been recognized that the Pennsylvania Constitution "only preserves
the right to trial by jury in those cases where it existed at the time the [C]onstitution was
adopted." WJ Dillner, 155 A2d at 435. In WJ Dillner, defendant, charged with transporta-
tion of the commission's property without authority, demanded a jury trial. Id. The Penn-
sylvania Supreme Court denied the request since the "matters committed by the legislature
to the Public Utility Commission were then nonexistent. Hence no right to jury trial existed
which could be preserved." Id. In a case two years later, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
ruled that "the individual is entitled to a public trial by an impartial jury of the vicinage in
every situation in which he would have been entitled to such a trial at the time of the
adoption of our State Constitution of 1790 and ever since under our succeeding constitu-
tions." Goldman, 173 A2d at 64. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court held in Goldman that
since utterance of obscene matter (the crime at issue) was a crime at common law for which
a defendant chargeable was entitled to a trial by jury, the defendant in the instant case had
a right to a jury trial. Id at 64-65.
46. Appeal of Watson, 377 Pa 495, 105 A2d 576 (1954). A teacher who was dismissed
by a school board was not entitled to a jury trial in her legal action against the board since
the right did not exist in those proceedings before 1790. Watson, 105 A2d at 578.
47. 618 F2d 453 (7th Cir 1980).
48. Mercedes Benz, 618 F2d at 458.
49. 1 Stat 73, § 9 (1789). The Act has been more correctly entitled "An Act to Estab-
lish the Judicial Courts of the United States." Id.
50. Id.
51. These justices were Justice Marshall in The Sarah, 21 US 644 (1823), who enun-
ciated the idea that all cases of seizure on land logically evolved from English common law,
The Sarah, 21 US 644-45; and Justice Stevens-in Rogers v Loether, 467 F2d 1110 (7th Cir
1972), who afforded the defendant a jury trial even though the issue was limited to the
specific amount of punitive damages awardable. Rogers, 467 F2d at 1122-23.
52. Justice Marshall stated that "in the trial of all cases of seizure, on land, the court
sits as a court of common law." The Sarah, 21 US at 644. Justice Stevens stated that "ex-
cept in admiralty, forfeiture cases are triable to a jury." Rogers, 467 F2d at 1123.
53. Mercedes Benz, 618 F2d at 468. The court noted the "time-honored tradition of
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the court to conclude that the right to a jury trial originated from
statutes and common law, and exists in all land forfeiture
proceedings.
54
The Camaro decision raises some doubts with respect to the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court's adherence to the doctrine of stare
decisis.55 Not only did the Supreme Court overrule relatively re-
cent precedent,6 but the court miraculously discovered the present
right to a jury trial in a forfeiture proceeding in a case set forth
over two hundred years ago in the colonial era.5 7 Admittedly, the
court is duty-bound to create deserved rights. But it is too far-
reaching to create a jury right out of a forfeiture proceeding which
is indirectly related to a personal right. In addition, the proceeding
is often only peripheral to related criminal proceedings and is ar-
guably outweighed by compelling state interests. Specifically, the
subject of a forfeiture proceeding is the property itself and not the
owner of the property. Nonetheless, the owner has often already
been found guilty of the underlying crime. Accordingly, it seems
inequitable and costly to allow a jury trial in every forfeiture
proceeding.
On the other hand, one might argue that property rights today
have emerged as vital, perhaps more vital than liberty rights. Yet
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has precariously reached past
precedent for less than compelling reasons. 5 As noted by Justice
McDermott, the majority failed to outline any exceptions where
the right to a jury trial in a forfeiture proceeding would not be
afforded. 9 In fact, had the majority granted an additional trial by
jury for a forfeiture proceeding subsequent to the owner being con-
victed of the underlying criminal act, Justice McDermott would
American commitment to jury trial, extending back to the Continental Congress," and
Blackstone's view that the English dedication to trial by jury was more pronounced in the
new world. Id.
54. Id at 466-67.
55. Camaro, 610 A2d at 41-42. These doubts are best articulated in the concurring
opinion of Justice McDermott. Id.
56. Id at 41 citing Commonwealth v Bowers, 304 Pa 253, 155 A 605 (1931). In Bowers,
the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held that a jury trial was not required in all forfeiture
proceedings because the issue before the court often only concerned a disputed issue of law,
not fact. Bowers, 155 A at 608.
57. Wilcox v Henry, 1 US 41 (1782).
58. Camaro, 610 A2d at 39-41. Because a jury trial in a forfeiture proceeding existed
at the time of the adoption of the Pennsylvania Constitution and originated from "common
law," the owner of seized property has the right to a trial by jury in a forfeiture proceeding.
Id. Justice McDermott agrees with the majority's decision and concurs, but doubts the
means by which the court reached its ruling. Id at 41-42.
59. Id at 42.
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have dissented. The majority, however, through its historical "ro-
mantic leap," did not categorize its ruling for particular forfeiture
cases.6 0 As such, Justice McDermott agreed with the decision as it
related to the Stucks' factual situation because there had been no
prior adjudication of the facts. He was wary, however, of the un-
limited scope of the majority's newly .created jury right.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court, relying on colonial case law
and other circuits, while overruling analogous state precedent, has
created a ruling supported with less than compelling rationale."
Given such doubtful arguments, the majority's discussion of the is-
sue of the ultimate right to a jury trial in all forfeiture proceedings
remains incomplete. In fact, a case exhibiting a different fact pat-
tern than the Stucks' may have altered (and still might effect) the
course of Pennsylvania case law on the subject. Nevertheless, every
owner of seized property, regardless of any related criminal adjudi-
cation, is now entitled to a jury trial.
It remains to be seen if later decisions might create factual ex-
ceptions to the newly created right. This author believes that the
judicial system will become more costly and complex, forcing the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court to renew its analysis and possibly
forcing the legislature to fill in the gaps as mentioned by Justice
McDermott.62 Clearly, the Stucks are entitled to a jury trial pursu-
ant to Article I, section 6 of the Pennsylvania Constitution;63 but
must every owner be afforded a jury trial and can Pennsylvania
legally and economically afford one as well? Who is to say that the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court, judging from its fairly original rea-
soning in Camaro, might not approach other judicial issues with
such sweeping rationale? Possibly, the legislature is better suited
to making guidelines for when and if jury rights are afforded in
forfeiture proceedings, than is the judiciary, which allowed the par-






63. Id at 41.
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